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WRITING IT RIGHT

Acronyms
By Douglas E. Abrams

Alphabet Soup

On June 1, 2012, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit decided National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. United States Department of
Energy.1 The three-judge panel held that
the challenged agency determination
violated the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982.2 Without conducting a valid
cost evaluation required by the Act, the
agency had refused to adjust or suspend
annual fees collected from owners and
operators of nuclear power plants to
cover costs of the government’s longterm disposal of civilian nuclear waste.
The parties hotly contested the case
with servings of alphabet soup. On page
48 of its 58-page brief, for example, the
Association argued: “Although DOE
has not disclaimed its obligation to dispose of SNF, it is undisputed that DOE
currently has no active waste disposal
program. . . . The BRC is undertaking
none of the waste disposal program
activities identified in NWPA § 302(d).
Its existence therefore cannot justify
continued NWF fee collection.”3
On page 24 of its 60-page brief,
the agency countered that “[t]he plain
language of the NWPA . . . provides
the Secretary [of Energy] with broad
discretion in determining whether to
recommend a change to the statutory
NWF fee. . . . In section 302(a)(2) of the
NWPA, Congress set the amount of the
NWF fee – which is paid only by utilities that enter into contracts with DOE
for the disposal of their SNF and HLW.
. . .”4
Get it?
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The court’s opinion admonished the
parties for “abandon[ing] any attempt
to write in plain English, instead abbreviating every conceivable agency and
statute involved, familiar or not, and
littering their briefs with references to
‘SNF,’ ‘HLW,’ ‘NWF,’ ‘NWPA,’ and
‘BRC’ — shorthand for ‘spent nuclear
fuel,’ ‘high-level radioactive waste,’
the ‘Nuclear Waste Fund,’ the ‘Nuclear
Waste Policy Act,’ and the ‘Blue Ribbon
Commission.’”5
Writing for the unanimous panel,
Judge Laurence H. Silberman instructed
that “[b]rief-writing, no less than ‘written English, is full of bad habits which
spread by imitation and which can be
avoided if one is willing to take the
necessary trouble.’”6 The D.C. Circuit’s
Handbook of Practice and Internal
Procedures flags the bad habit that occasioned the court’s instruction here:
“[P]arties are strongly urged to limit
the use of acronyms. While acronyms
may be used for entities and statutes
with widely recognized initials, such as
FERC and FOIA, parties should avoid
using acronyms that are not widely
known.”7
The confusion created by the parties’
casual use of acronyms appeared particularly stark because Judge Silberman
and his colleagues were not newcomers
unaccustomed to the federal administrative thicket. The D.C. Circuit has been
called “a de facto, quasi-specialized
administrative law court”8 because it
“has exclusive jurisdiction over a variety
of challenges to administrative action
and hears a disproportionate share of
the United States’ administrative law
cases.”9 The court’s “steady diet”10 of

federal agency review proceedings includes ones involving the Department
of Energy. The three judges hearing the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act appeal had
served an aggregate total of 59 years
on the court.11

A Rule of Reason

Lawyers’ use of acronyms should be
guided by a “rule of reason” that, in the
exercise of sound judgment, balances
two threshold considerations. On the one
hand, when an acronym recognizable
by the intended audience is fully identified at its first appearance, the acronym
can simplify the writer’s message and
help readers move more easily from
paragraph to paragraph. On the other
hand, as the D.C. Circuit intimates, an
acronym concocted by the writer or
otherwise unknown to most readers can
impede that movement, even with initial
full identification.
Timing and appreciation for a reader’s
ordinary attention span may also matter.
To be fair to the Association and the
agency in the recent D.C. Circuit appeal, the parties’ briefs did fully identify
acronyms the first time they appeared.
In any expositive writing, however,
even apparently recognizable acronyms
fully identified early can leave readers
disoriented when the acronym does not
appear again until several pages later
(perhaps a dozen or more pages later in a
brief, and even several dozen in a book).
Rather than force readers to refresh their
memories by scanning several prior
pages to ferret out the full identification,
the writer applying the rule of reason
might be better off repeating the full
name again.
In the recent appeal, for example,
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the parties fully identified the “Nuclear
Waste Fund (NWF)” on page 1 of their
respective briefs. Even if some readers
might be familiar with the acronym,
however, scrapping the shorthand by
repeating the full name a dozen or more
pages later would have better served
the parties’ efforts to communicate effectively with the court.
These basic principles apply not only
in briefs and other submissions written
for courts, but also in articles, monographs, books and other publications
written for a more general readership of
lawyers or non-lawyers.
Submissions to Courts
Judges seasoned in administrative
review decided the recent Nuclear Waste
Policy Act appeal, but judges in general
jurisdiction courts may not initially be as
familiar as counsel with the substantive
law that determines the outcome. As
American law has grown increasingly
intricate and diverse in recent decades,
more and more lawyers have maintained
specialty practices.12 Specialization
means that judges may come from
private or public sector careers that
exposed them regularly to only some of
the ever-expanding constitutional and
non-constitutional law questions that
now shape their dockets. Casual use of
acronyms and other jargon comes with
risks because, according to one federal
district court, writers gamble when they
“presuppose specialized knowledge on
the part of their readers.”13
Reliance on recognized acronyms,
like reliance on other professional jargon, may serve a legal writer’s purpose
when the audience consists solely of
readers trained in the writer’s specialty.
But without this foundation of common
understanding, warns Judge Richard A.
Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 7th Circuit, “much legal jargon can
obscure rather than illuminate a particu-

lar case.”14
“There is nothing wrong with a specialized vocabulary – for use by specialists,” Judge Posner explained. “Federal
district and circuit judges, however, . . .
are generalists. . . . Lawyers should understand the judges’ limited knowledge
of specialized fields and choose their
vocabulary accordingly.”15
Plain English may warrant counsel’s
particular attention when, as in the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act case, the
court reviews a federal agency decision.
Intricate administrative rules and regulations, grounded as they often are in
sometimes opaque enabling legislation,
can create labyrinths most effectively
negotiated by specialists. In recent
generations, administrative law has
grown “extremely complex,”16 so much
so that Justice Scalia has remarked that
“[a]dministrative law is not for sissies.”17
The practical upshot of administrative
complexity, according to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, is that
lawyers regularly immersed in an agency’s practice may acquire “insights and
experience denied judges. The subtleties
. . . encased in jargon and tucked into
interstices of the administrative scheme,
may escape us.”18 “It is the responsibilities of the parties to properly educate the
court,” explains a federal district judge,
“not of the court to improperly defer to
an agency decision.”19
Because effective written communication is a two-way street, judges also
should apply a rule of reason when they
consider whether to use acronyms in
lengthy opinions. Casual use of acronyms may unnecessarily break the readers’ flow because the opinion’s primary
audience – the lawyers who handle a
particular case or later seek precedents,
and the clients whose rights and obligations hang in the balance – may also not
be specialists in the field that gives rise

to the decision. Justice Elena Kagan is
right that a court preparing an opinion
should strive to “figure out how to communicate complicated ideas to people
who know a lot less than you do about
a certain subject.”20
Writing for a General Readership
Most legal writing targets a discrete
audience readily identifiable in advance,
and early identification may help inform the decision whether and when to
use acronyms in articles, monographs,
books or other writings that seek to reach
a general audience beyond the courts.
An audience of lawyers trained in the
writer’s specialty may be able to digest
acronyms more easily than an audience
of lawyers trained in other specialties,
or an audience of clients or other lay
readers unaccustomed to legal discussion altogether. Analysis that resonates
with some readers may create barriers
for others.
At its best, writing is a dialog, and
not a monolog. Writers may understand
what they mean to say, but the key is
whether readers will also understand and
remain with the text until the end. When
a frustrated reader quits in midstream for
inability or unwillingness to converse
in acronyms or other unfamiliar jargon,
the writer fails in the core mission – to
finish before the reader does. As stage
and screen actress Shirley Booth said
soon after winning an Academy Award
in 1952, “the audience is 50 percent of
the performance.”21

Conclusion: Bridging the
Gap

In court filings and other expression
that applies the rule of reason, the soundest advice for writers is to err on the side
of avoiding overreliance on acronyms.
Unless the writer publishes with greater
grasp of the subject matter than the average reader, the writer should not publish
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at all. Freewheeling use of acronyms
can create unnecessary, avoidable roadblocks that thwart the writer’s effort to
bridge the gap.
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